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takes the form of an issuance of stock by the surviving corporation. The
issuance of stock in conjunction with a merger fulfills the requirements of
Ruckle and Hooper, and results in a securities act "sale." Thus the long form
merger involves a "sale" of securities so as to afford an injured party a remedy
under the antifraud provisions of the securities acts.
The foregoing analysis has revealed that a technical "sale" exists in
both the long form and the short form merger. In neither of the noted cases
did the court feel such an analysis was necessary to the decision, choosing
instead to rely upon the congressional intent manifested in the legislative
history of the securities acts. Although these courts probably reached a result
which was consistent with the equities of the cases, such a method of dealing
with this important securities law issue is an unsatisfactory method of devel-
oping a stable body of law. Until the courts face the problem of whether
merger involves a "sale" in a manner which is consistent with corporate
law and the financial realities of merger transactions, the freedom of judges
to interpret legislative history will remain unimpaired and the rights and
responsibilities of the financial community and the investing public under
the securities laws will be uncertain.
PETER W. BROWN
Securities Regulation—Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Voting Trust
Regulated Under Section I4(a).—Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon?
—A group of shareholders of Greater Iowa Corporation organized a voting
trust2 with the objective of controlling the corporation or gaining a voice in
its management. The voting-trust organizers, dissatisfied with the corpora-
tion's management apparently because of poor earnings and a decline in
stock value, solicited memberships for the "Iowa Trust" from 45 of the
12,000 Greater Iowa Corporation shareholders. Solicitation was carried out
mainly on a person-to-person basis in Iowa, but memberships were also sought
by mail and telephone from shareholders in other states.
Plaintiffs, Greater Iowa Corporation, its directors and three shareholders
purporting to represent the class of all shareholders in the corporation,
brought an action to enjoin all further activity of the trust.3 According to
plaintiffs, the Iowa Trust had failed to register its securities 4 with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 5 had made deceptive statements in its
1 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967).
2 In general, the voting trust is a device for concentrating the voting power of several
shareholders into one party so that the latter may control or have partial control of the
corporation. To participate in a voting trust, the shareholder transfers his shares in
the corporation to trustees. The trustees then become holders of legal title to the shares,
with power to vote them at shareholders' meetings.
3 Brief for Appellant at 5, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967).
4 Under the Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964), a voting-trust
certificate is defined as a "security," so that it is regulated under the securities acts. A
voting trust issues such certificates to its participating shareholders to indicate the number
of shares delivered to it by the shareholder.
5 As required by the Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1964), and
the Investment Company Act of 1940 § 7(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(a) (1) (1964).
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solicitation materials,° and had failed to comply with SEC proxy-solicitation
rules. These rules require submission of solicitation materials to the Commis-
sion before sending such materials to shareholders,7 require the sending of a
standard "proxy statement" to shareholders, 8 and prohibit false or misleading
statements in solicitation materials .° They are promulgated under Section
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or
by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce . . . , in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe ... for the protection of investors, to solicit ... any proxy
or consent or authorization in respect of any [registered] security
10
. . .
The trial court granted summary judgment to defendants, holding that
a voting trust could not be a "proxy or consent or authorization" within the
Act. 11 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit HELD: Reversed. A voting trust may
constitute a "proxy or consent or authorization" within the meaning of
section I4(a). The court further stated that section 14(a) and rules promul-
gated under it should apply "when [ever] any group, regardless of the label
attached, has as it [sic] goal the influencing or control of a registered corpora-
tion, and through organized, widespread solicitation seeks to secure the voting
rights of shareholders, reserving in these shareholders a beneficial interest
in the registered corporation . . . ."12 The case was remanded for trial on
6 Plaintiffs charged that defendants had violated the Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a),
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1964), and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.106-5 (1967), all of which prohibit the use of manipulative or deceptive devices
in connection with the purchase or sale of a registered security.
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1967).
8 Id. § 240.14a-3.
Id. § 240.14a-9.
10 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964). This note will consider only whether solicitation for
a voting trust should be regulated as solicitation of a proxy under § 14(a). Both the
trial court and the appellate court held that a corporation does not have standing to
enjoin violations of the securities acts' registration and antifraud provisions. Whether a
corporation should have standing 'to enforce these provisions has been discussed else-
where. See Comment, Private Enforcement Under Rule 10b-5: An Injunction for a
Corporate Issuer? 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 618 (1967). Federal jurisdiction attached in
Greater Iowa because defendants used the mails and solicited memberships across state
boundaries. Once federal jurisdiction attaches in a securities case, all requirements of
the securities acts are applicable. Creswell-Keith, Inc. v. Willingham, 264 F.2d 76 (8th
Cir. 1959). Iowa law requires registration of securities issued there, Iowa Code Ann.
§ 502.7 (1949), and a voting trust seems to be included in the definition of "security"
included in Iowa Code Ann. § 502.3(1) (1949). The requirements of fair and honest dis-
closure to the investor contained in the Iowa• Code are much like those of the federal
securities acts. Iowa Code Ann. §§ 502.7, -.10 (1949). Plaintiffs' allegations of violations
of state law were not considered in either the district court's summary judgment or the
circuit court's opinion, but will be taken up on retrial. 378 F.2d at 799.
11 Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, Civil No. 66-C-511-EC (ND. Iowa, Dec. 2,
1966).
12 378 F.2d at 798.
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whether solicitation of membership in the Iowa Trust amounted to solicita-
tion of a proxy, consent or authorization. 13
Because section 14(a) explicitly mentions a "proxy" but not a "voting
trust," a comparison of the two devices will be necessary in determining
whether the latter falls within the statute's ambit. "Proxy" means the grant
of authority by a stockholder to another person to vote the former's shares "
The shareholder specifies the extent of authority granted and generally re-
serves the power to revoke the authority at any time . 13 The general proxy,
which is the most frequently used, empowers the proxy holder to vote on
all ordinary business but not on such unusual transactions as a fundamental
change in the corporate charter or dissolution. 16 The proxy could not, for
instance, vote to transfer all of the corporation's assets to another corpora-
tion. 11 Nor could the proxy normally vote for reorganization of the corpora-
tion. 18 A proxy is usually given for a short period of time—commonly for a
particular meeting or purpose. 12
The proxy has become a necessary device by which voting rights are
exercised in large, publicly held corporations. Most states require that a
quorum constituting a majority of voting shares be present at a shareholders'
meeting. In large corporations, it would be practically impossible to accom-
modate this majority at a meeting. Further, shareholders may fail to attend
because of lack of interest or a feeling that they are incapable of under-
standing business at a meeting. Thus the proxy system provides a necessary
method of assuring that a quorum will be present or represented.
Unlike the proxy, the voting trust is not an ordinary means of exercising
voting rights. Instead, the voting trust has developed as a method of binding
shareholders' votes into a cohesive block in order to meet a particular need. 2°
To participate, the shareholder delivers his stock certificates to the voting
trustees.21 The trust then issues voting-trust certificates to the shareholder
as evidence of his beneficial interest in the trust.22 The trustees are given
13 The court declined to rule as a matter of law that defendants' voting trust came
within the proscription of § 14(a) since there had been no trial on the merits. Id.
14 5 Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations 1071 (1967). Other usages of the term
"proxy" are: (1) the instrument by which authority is granted; (2) the agent to whom
authority is granted; and (3) the manner of voting through an agent.
15 H. Ballantine, Corporations 407, 409 (rev. ed. 1946). To grant a proxy is to create
a principal-agent relationship.
18 Id. at 407.
17 Bossing v. State Bank of Bode, 181 Iowa 1013, 1018-19, 165 N.W. 254, 256-57
(1917).
19 Farish v. Cieneguita Copper Co., 12 Ariz. 235, 241, 100 P. 781, 783 (1909).
19 H. Ballantine, supra note 15, at 411; 5 Z. Cavitch,. supra note 14, at 1082-83
n.27. The shareholder giving the proxy may fix its duration. Some state statutes limit
the proxy's duration unless the instrument provides otherwise. E.g., N.Y. Gen. Corp.
Law § 19(3) (McKinney Supp. 1967), which limits the duration of the proxy to
eleven months unless otherwise provided for in the agreement.
2° Comment, The Voting Trust, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 290-92 (1959).
21 In most cases the voting trustees then surrender the stock certificates to the
corporation; a transfer is made on the books of the corporation; and new shares are
issued in the name of the trustees. 5 Z. Cavitch, supra note 14, at 1154-55. This step is
not required by Iowa law. Iowa Code Ann. § 496A.33 (1962).
22 5 Z. Cavitch, supra note 14, at 1155. "The holders of voting trust certificates are
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authority to vote on all ordinary business coming before shareholders and
all unusual business which the contract specifies may be voted on by the
trustees.23 The trust constitutes a contract for a stated period, 24 the share-
holder usually retaining no power to withdraw his shares, or, at best, a limited
power.25 An unlimited power of withdrawal, while possible, would seem to
defeat the usual purpose of binding voting power into a united block. Pro-
tecting unorganized minority shareholders by combining their votes into a
strong block is one of the normal uses of the voting trust, 26 and was no doubt
contemplated by the organizers of the Iowa Trust.
A shareholder who participates in a voting trust gives up a much greater
parcel of voting rights than one who authorizes a proxy. The grant of voting
rights to the trustees is usually irrevocable and the scope of the right given
is practically unlimited. The time for which it is given is usually substantial.
In reality, once he has given his stock to the voting trustees, the shareholder
loses all power to manage his shares or business coming before corporate
shareholders.2 I Nevertheless, the devices are similar to the degree that they
both deprive the shareholder of his right to vote. Whether the shareholder
has power to revoke the authority given seems secondary to the essential
feature of both devices: that the shareholder confers power to another to
vote his shares for some period of time.
Whether a voting trust is a "proxy or consent or authorization" under
section 14(a) should be determined in the light of the essential similarity of
the proxy and voting trust as means of exercising the corporate franchise. The
Greater Iowa court held that the provisions of section 14(a) should be con-
strued broadly to cover solicitation for a voting trust. The established trend
in statutory construction of the securities acts supports that holding. The
court relied on reasoning in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,28 a securities
often spoken of as 'equitable owners' of shares of stock." They are equitable tenants
in common with contract rights to receive dividends and to have transferred back to them
a specified number of shares on termination of the trust. H. Ballantine, supra note 15,
at 431.
28 5 Z. Cavitch, supra note 14, at 1182.
24 The Iowa Trust agreement did not specify the duration of the trust. It was
"expected" to endure for five years, but the duration was left to the discretion of the
trustees. The Iowa Trust 9. Under Iowa law a voting trust could continue for 20 years.
Iowa Code Ann. § 496A.33 (1962). Most states limit by statute the duration of a
voting trust. The average period is 10 years, but the period may vary from 5 to 21
years. 5 Z. Cavitch, supra note 14, at 1168-69.
26 In the Iowa Trust agreement, the trustees, at their discretion, could pay the
shareholder in cash at any time prior to dissolution of the trust, rather than return the
shares of Greater Iowa Corporation stock. The Iowa Trust 9.
26 Comment, The Voting Trust, supra note 20, at 291-92. A voting trust is also
used to secure stable management for the corporation and to prevent competing
corporations from buying up control of the corporation.
27 [T]he beneficial owner ceases to be recognized as a shareholder of record
and may be deprived not only of any right to vote for directors, but also of any
right to inspection, notice or information as against the corporation or any voice
in making most fundamental changes, such as mergers and consolidations, sales
of entire assets . . . , and by-law and charter amendments which may adversely
affect him.
H. Ballentine, supra note 15, at 431.
28 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
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case involving an analogous statutory construction problem, in which the
Supreme Court set forth the classic expression of this trend:
[C]ourts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its
dominating general purpose, will read text in the light of context and
will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly
permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed
legislative policy. 29
In Joiner, the Court considered whether an assignment of an oil lease on
property surrounding a test oil well was a sale of an investment contract or
security within the definitions of Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. 3'
Though using a standard real property form of assignment of an oil lease, the
defendants were, in effect, raising capital for their test drilling. Defendants
showed that an assignment of an oil lease was unlike any of the specific
types of security mentioned in section 2(1), which provides:
"[5] ecurity" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, . . . investment contract, .. .
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security" . . . .
They then argued that the general term "any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a 'security,' " following a series of terms of specific meaning,
should not be given its full and general meaning, but that it should be held
to apply only to securities of the same kind as those that preceded it. De-
fendants concluded that section 2(1) did not cover an assignment of an
oil lease. The Court rejected defendants' argument, saying, "We cannot read
out of the statute these general descriptive designations merely because more
specific ones have been used to reach some kinds of documents."n It held that
if the lease assignment transferred an economic interest in the enterprise of
drilling for oil and was widely dealt in in a manner which established its
character as a security, then it was to be regulated as a security 9 2 Such
regulation was adjudged appropriate, although an assignment of an oil lease
was not mentioned specifically in section 2(1), because "trading in these
documents had all the evils inherent in the securities transactions which it
was the aim of the Securities Act to end."33 The Court, in effect, gave each
29 Id. at 350-51. In short, the court first determines legislative purpose, then in light
of this purpose interprets the literal statutory provisions in the particular case.
We can best reach the meaning here, as always, by recourse to the underlying
purpose, and, with that as a guide, by trying to project upon the specific occasion
how we think persons, actuated by such purpose, would have dealt with it,
if it had been presented to them at the time. To say that that is a hazardous
process is indeed a truism, but we cannot escape it, once we abandon literal
interpretation—a method far more unreliable.
Borella v. Borden Co., 145 F.2d 63, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J.), aff'd, 325 U.S.
679 (1945).
30 15 U.S.C.	 77b(1) (1964).
31 320 U.S. at 351.
32 Id. at 349, 351.
33 Id. at 349.
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substantive term in section 20) a full and unrestricted meaning. Application
of the Joiner method of statutory construction to section 14(a) would bring
a voting trust within its purview. Section 14(a) provides that it shall be
unlawful to solicit "any proxy or consent or authorization" without compli-
ance with SEC rules. The first question in interpreting this provision is
whether the general terms "consent" and "authorization" are limited by the
specific term "proxy" which precedes them. It is submitted that the general
terms should not be so limited. The three categories are grouped disjunctively
by the word "or" indicating an apparent intent to give each term equal
force.84 If disjunctive interpretation is given to these categories, the general
terms could not be influenced by the specific and the general term "authoriza-
tion" might then be given its common meaning—a grant or endowment with
power or authority.33 This meaning is sufficient to cover a voting trust or any
device in which the shareholder authorizes or endows a party with power to
vote his shares.
One may argue and some cases have held that "or" is often used in
legislation as a substitute for the conjunctive "and" 36 lending support to the
position that section 14(a) deals only with the proxy and that "consent"
and "authorization" are used only to describe acts involved in granting a
proxy. But it appears that only a disjunctive interpretation is appropriate
for section 14(a). Generally, courts have varied from the usual disjunctive
meaning of "or" where it is clear from the context that the legislature intended
the conjunctive meaning to apply or where it is necessary to make the
provision conform with legislative history or purpose on the subject matter. 37
But there is no reason, from the legislative history of section 14(a), to give
a conjunctive meaning to "or." 38 On the contrary, in context the phrase
"proxy or consent or authorization" (Emphasis added.) rather than "proxy,
consent or authorization" exhibits a purposeful attempt to keep each of the
categories separate. Further, Dunning v. Rotten," a recent district court
case, has construed section 14(a) to give independent meaning to each of
these categories. There, the court declined to limit the term "consent" by the
term "proxy" preceding it." By the applicable canons of statutory construc-
34 "Or" is commonly used as a disjunctive. State v. Dennis, 150 Conn. 245, 248, 188
A.2d 65, 66-67 (1963); State ex rd. Finigan v. Norfolk Live Stock Sales Co., 178 Neb.
87, 89, 132 N.W.2d 302, 304 (1964).
35 See 378 F.2d at 796.
36 See DeSylva v. Ballantine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), in which the Court found that
legislative history of an act using "or" indicated that Congress intended the word to be
read in a conjunctive sense rather than as a disjunctive.
37 Id.; see Harris v. Egan, 135 Conn. 102, 105, 60 A.2d 922, 924 (1948). But see
Union Starch & Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
815 (1951).
38 See Dunning v. Balton, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
5 91,660 (ND. Cal. 1965). There the court appears not even to consider the possibility that
any interpretation other than the disjunctive should be attached to "or." The court
in Greater Iowa apparently found no necessity to support its position that Congress
intended any meaning other than the disjunctive to be applied to the phrase "proxy
or consent or authorization." 378 F.2d at 796.
39 [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 91,660 (ND. Cal. 1965).
40 Id. at 95,436.
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tion, "or" should be interpreted in the disjunctive, and the substantive
terms in subsection (a) should be given full effect. "Authorization" should be
given it broadest meaning, and should include a voting trust.
Not only statutory construction, but also the congressional purpose in
enacting section 14(a), require the bringing of a voting trust within the com-
pass of the section. The Greater Iowa court concluded that section 14(a)
was enacted to ensure full, open disclosure of information to shareholders
whose voting rights are being sought. Since nondisclosure by a voting trust
threatens these rights, the court brought the shareholder solicitation within
the act. The securities acts, it reasoned, are remedial; that is, they were
enacted to prevent manipulations in securities transactions and the economic
ills which resulted therefrom. 4 ' The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
has four basic purposes: to afford a measure of disclosure to people
who buy and sell securities; to prevent and afford remedies for
fraud in securities trading and manipulation of the markets; to
regulate the securities markets; and to control the amount of the
Nation's credit which goes into those markets. 42
The remedial purpose of section 14(a) is the protection of "fair corporate
suffrage."43 The provisions of section 14(a) and the Commission's proxy
rules promote this objective by assuring full and accurate disclosure to the
shareholder whose proxy, consent or authorization is sought." It is a familiar
canon of statutory construction that remedial statutes are liberally construed
41 378 F.2d at 795. The official purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 is "to provide
full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof . . . ." 48
Stat. 74 (1933).
The regulation of the securities market has been made necessary by the
increasing complexity of the economy, which so diffuses and differentiates the
financial interests of the ordinary citizen, that he no longer has any personal
contact with the managers of all his interests. The Securities Exchange Act is
intended to extend the legal conception of a fiduciary relationship by regu-
lating stock exchanges and the relationships of the investing public to corpora-
tions which invite investment by listing on exchanges.
2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 21,125, at 15,553 (1966).
42 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 130-31 (2d ed. 1961).
43 The section stemmed from the congressional belief that "[flair corporate
suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity security bought
on a public exchange." H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13. It was in-
tended to "control the conditions under which proxies may be solicited with a
view to preventing the recurrence of abuses which ... [had] frustrated the free
exercise of the voting rights of stockholders." Id. at 14.
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
44 See SEC v. May, 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956).
Appellants' fundamental complaint appears to be that stockholder disputes
should be viewed in the eyes of the law just as are political contests, with each
side free to hurl charges with comparative unrestraint, the assumption being that
the opposing side is then at liberty to refute and thus effectively deflate the "cam-
paign oratory" of its adversary. Such, however, was not the policy of Congress as
enacted in the Securities Exchange Act. There Congress has clearly entrusted
to the Commission the duty of protecting the investing public against misleading
statements made in the course of a struggle for corporate control.
Id. at 124.
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to carry out their remedial purposes.45 Insofar as the wording of section 14(a)
will permit, then, any device which controls the exercise of shareholders'
voting rights should be regulated." A shareholder does give up voting rights
when he joins a voting trust. Indeed, he does so even more effectively than
when he gives a proxy. Therefore, the congressional purpose of protecting
shareholders' voting rights will necessitate a broad statutory reading, includ-
ing a voting trust under section 14(a).
Courts have given this broad reading to section 14(a) and similar laws.
One case, SEC v. Okin,47 involved a communication sent to shareholders
requesting that they withhold or revoke any previously authorized proxies.
Such communications are not mentioned in section 14(a). But the court
held that this communication was regulated by SEC proxy rules so long as it
was part of a continuous plan resulting in solicitation for a proxy and pre-
paring the way for its success. It was reasoned that unless such presolicitation
communications were regulated, the purpose of the proxy rules would be
defeated since the person seeking to obtain the proxy could spread the misin-
formation prior to actual solicitation and be free from regulation."
Similarly, the court in Dunning v. Rafton," resorted to the remedial
purpose of section 14(a) as a basis for holding that a request that share-
holders terminate their membership in a voting trust ought to be regulated
as a solicitation of "consent." The court decided that the purpose of the
securities acts was to protect shareholders' interests. "Whether this struggle
involves solicitation for someone else's proxy or circularizations urging him to
vote, himself, in a certain manner, does not lessen the need for protection
against misleading statements." 5° In short, the legislative purpose behind
section 14(a), as interpreted by the courts, requires that any solicitation of
voting rights, including a voting trust, be regulated under its provisions.
Besides the reasons of statutory interpretation and congressional purpose,
practical necessity requires that voting-trust solicitations be covered by
securities regulations. If the voting-trust solicitation were not regulated, one
would need only to set up a voting trust in lieu of a proxy committee in
order to escape regulation. It is true that a voting trust is a more expensive and
less attractive device than the proxy for combining votes. Tax 5 ' and adminis-
45 SEC v. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 353-55; Guardian Trust & Deposit Co. v. Fisher, 200
U.S. 57, 69-70 (1906).
46 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). The Court
held it unnecessary for the SEC to prove all the elements of common law fraud in a
case brought under the securities acts' antifraud provisions: "Congress intended the In-
vestment Advisors Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. §§ 8013-1 to -b-20 (1964)] to be construed like
other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds,' not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. at 195.
41 132 F.2d 784 (2d Cir. 1943) (L. Hand, J.) The Okin case, involving a utility
company, was brought under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 12(e),
15 U.S.C. § 791(e) (1964), the provisions of which are substantially identical to § 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act.
48 132 F.2d at 786; accord, Studebaker Corp. v. Gatlin, 360 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir.
1966).
49 [1964-1966 Transfer Binder) CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. § 91,660 (ND. Cal. 1965).
50 Id. at 95,437.
51 In New York State, a stock transfer tax is levied on transfers of voting-trust
certificates just as on other securities, N.Y. Tax Law § 270(1) (McKinney 1954), as
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trative expenses incurred in operating the trust are generally passed on to the
shareholder by deducting them from corporative dividends. 52
The costs of maintaining a proxy solicitation, on the other hand, are
borne by the solicitation committee, not the shareholder. 53 The shareholders'
dividends will not be affected by a proxy solicitation, except that some judi-
cial decisions have permitted the corporation to assume the expenses of a
solicitation committee that succeeds in gaining control of the corporation."
A voting trust, therefore, is generally more expensive to a shareholder than is
a proxy. Other factors which make the voting trust less attractive to the
shareholder than the proxy are: (1) loss of legal status as shareholder, (2)
dependence of his interest on those of the trustees, and (3) inability to
revoke the trust.
Despite these general disadvantages, a voting trust could be set up to
operate in much the same manner as a proxy. The trust might be drawn to
terminate in one or two years. The shareholder might be given the power
to revoke his participation. Further advantage would be gained if the voting
trust were free from the expense and rigors of complying with SEC rules on
disclosure. Then despite the extra expense the shareholder could easily be
persuaded to join fin Thus a voting-trust agreement could be executed which
would be substantially the same as a proxy, differing only in formalities. To
allow circumvention of the proxy rules merely on the basis of form would
defeat the congressional objective of protecting shareholders' voting rights.
Statutory interpretation of section 14(a), its general purpose, and practi-
cal necessity have been shown to require regulation of a voting-trust solicita-
tion. The problem in Greater Iowa may be considered from yet a fourth
aspect: could the defendants have received fair notice, in a practical sense,
from a reading of the securities acts, that the SEC proxy rules would apply
to their solicitation? The specific provisions of section 14(a) do not mention
voting trusts. The defense has indicated that a study of the securities acts
convinced them that no section applied to the Iowa Trust. 5°
It is submitted, however, that the probability that solicitation for a
voting trust is regulated by section 14(a) should be generally apparent to
parties organizing the trust. A position that section 14(a) is vague vis-à-vis
regulation of voting-trust solicitations neglects several factors: (1) that
regulatory statutes are to be read not according to "academic definition [s]
of abstract terms" but by "the practical criterion of fair notice to those to
interpreted in Chicago Great Western Railroad Co. v. State, 197 App. Div. 742, 743,
189 N.Y.S. 457 (1921), aff'd, 233 N.Y. 661, 662, 135 N.E. 960 (1922), imposing another
financial burden on voting trusts in that state.
52 5 Z. Cavitch, supra note 14, at 1160; cf. The Iowa Trust 8, providing that the
shareholders' interest in the trust "may he reduced in value in proportion to certain
necessary charges and expenses as authorized by the terms of [the] instrument . . . ."
53 E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, Proxy Contests for Corporate Control 10-12 (1957).
54 See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 173, 128
N.E.2d 291, 293 (1955).
55 It is significant that of some 40 Greater Iowa Corporation shareholders solicited,
about 22 joined the trust. That half of the parties solicited would give up their voting
rights for up to 20 years perhaps in itself rebuts the argument that the voting trust is
too cumbersome and expensive a device to attract wide usage. See note 24 supra.
50 Letter from Upton B. Kepford, attorney for the Iowa Trust, October 10, 1967.
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whom the statute is directed;" 57 (2) that the securities acts in general have
been interpreted to effectuate the broadest protection of shareholders' inter-
ests; and (3) that decisions like Okin and Dunning have applied this broad
interpretation specifically to section 14(a). When the statute is read in the
context of its general purpose, 58 the probability seems clear that solicitation
for a voting trust is regulated.
The Greater Iowa decision appears, on the whole, to be a proper extension
of the trend in statutory construction of the securities acts. The decision does
not overestimate congressional purpose nor does it read into the statute
meaning which is clearly not there. In the long run the decision will serve to
protect shareholders' interests by assuring full and accurate disclosure by
parties soliciting memberships for a voting trust of the same information as
is required in proxy solicitations. Moreover, it will not leave a gap in control
over voting devices on the basis of formal differences.
M. JAMES SHUMAKER
57 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 (1950) (Vinson,
C.J.).
58 Id. As a general rule, penal statutes are construed strictly while remedial statutes
are construed liberally. SEC v. Joiner, 320 U.S. at 353-55 and Guardian Trust & De-
posit Co. v. Fisher, 200 U.S. at 69-70. The Greater Iowa case presents the interesting
possibility that the statute would be construed broadly where, as here, a civil remedy
is sought, but strictly were criminal penalties sought. A strict construction of § 14(a)
might exclude those voting devices which were not specifically mentioned in the statute.
But the possibility of criminal action against the Iowa Trust seems remote. The SEC
has always enforced its proxy rules by seeking an injunction to be imposed until the
defendant complies with its requirements, rather than by prosecution. E. Aranow & H.
Einhorn, supra note 53, at 412.
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